Ariel Rubinstein is a professor of economics at the School of Economics at Tel Aviv University and at the Department of Economics at New York University. Previously, he occupied a position at Princeton University, Department of Economics.

He has published a long list of articles, with a strong focus on Economic Theory, Bounded rationality and Game Theory. His paper “Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model” (1982) is a milestone in bargaining theory. He has also written or edited eigth books, among which “A Course in Game Theory (1994)” with Martin J. Osborne, a popular textbook that can be found in libraries of any Economics department in the world.

His current or former editorial responsibilities include prestigious journal: Econometrica, The Journal of Economic Theory, The Review of Economic Studies, Mathematical Social Sciences, Economics of Philosophy, and many others.

Web page: http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/

At the conference, Professor Rubinstein will deliver the plenary talk titled “Three tales about a decentralized world with No Markets and No strategic Reasoning”.

Abstract:
Based on the book No Markets No Games, co-authored with Michael Richter (and is downloadable freely from https://arielrubinstein.org), this lecture presents three models of social harmony in the absence of markets and strategic games. The models explore how societies struggling with conflicts of interest may nevertheless reach stable arrangements through three mechanisms: power, norms that define what is forbidden, and indoctrination. The lecture argues for the development of new economic models that are neither market models nor game-theoretic models, yet offer alternative ways of thinking about social order, conflict, and harmony.